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The Key to Wisdom
Nearly forty years ago I discovered a profoundly significant idea – or so I believe.
Since then, I have expounded and developed the idea in six books1 and countless articles
published in academic journals and other books.2 I have talked about the idea in
universities and at conferences all over the UK, in Europe, the USA, Canada, and
Taiwan. And yet, alas, despite all this effort, few indeed are those who have even heard
of the idea. I have not even managed to communicate the idea to my fellow
philosophers.3
What did I discover? Quite simply: the key to wisdom.4 For over two and a half
thousand years, philosophy (which means “love of wisdom”) has sought in vain to
discover how humanity might learn to become wise – how we might learn to create an
enlightened world. For the ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates, Plato and the rest,
discovering how to become wise was the fundamental task for philosophy. In the modern
period, this central, ancient quest has been laid somewhat to rest, not because it is no
longer thought important, but rather because the quest is seen as unattainable. The record
of savagery and horror of the last century is so extreme and terrible that the search for
wisdom, more important than ever, has come to seem hopeless, a quixotic fantasy.
Nevertheless, it is this ancient, fundamental problem, lying at the heart of philosophy, at
the heart, indeed, of all of thought, morality, politics and life, that I have solved. Or so I
believe.
When I say I have discovered the key to wisdom, I should say, more precisely, that I
have discovered the methodological key to wisdom. Or perhaps, more modestly, I should
say that I have discovered that science contains, locked up in its astounding success in
acquiring knowledge and understanding of the universe, the methodological key to
wisdom. I have discovered a recipe for creating a kind of organized inquiry rationally
designed and devoted to helping humanity learn wisdom, learn to create a more
enlightened world.
What we have is a long tradition of inquiry – extraordinarily successful in its own
terms – devoted to acquiring knowledge and technological know-how. It is this that has
created the modern world, or at least made it possible. But scientific knowledge and
technological know-how are ambiguous blessings, as more and more people, these days,
are beginning to recognize. They do not guarantee happiness. Scientific knowledge and
technological know-how enormously increase our power to act. In endless ways, this
vast increase in our power to act has been used for the public good – in health,
agriculture, transport, communications, and countless other ways. But equally, this
enhanced power to act can be used to cause human harm, whether unintentionally, as in
environmental damage (at least initially), or intentionally, as in war. It is hardly too
much to say that all our current global problems have come about because of science and
technology. The appalling destructiveness of modern warfare and terrorism, vast
inequalities in wealth and standards of living between first and third worlds, rapid
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extinction of species, global warming, pollution of sea, earth and air, depletion of finite
natural resources – all only exist today because of modern science and technology.
Science and technology lead to modern industry and agriculture, to modern medicine and
hygiene, and thus in turn to population growth, to modern armaments, conventional,
chemical, biological and nuclear, to destruction of natural habitats, extinction of species,
pollution, and to immense inequalities of wealth around the globe.
Science without wisdom, we might say, is a menace. It is the crisis behind all the
others. When we lacked our modern, terrifying powers to act, before the advent of
science, lack of wisdom did not matter too much: we were bereft of the power to inflict
too much damage on ourselves and the planet. Now that we have modern science, and
the unprecedented powers to act that it has bequeathed to us, wisdom has become, not a
private luxury, but a public necessity. If we do not rapidly learn to become wiser, we are
doomed to repeat in the 21st century all the disasters and horrors of the 20th: the
horrifyingly destructive wars, the dislocation and death of millions, the degradation of the
world we live in. Only this time round it may all be much worse, as the population goes
up, the planet becomes ever more crowded, oil and other resources vital to our way of life
run out, weapons of mass destruction become more and more widely available for use,
and deserts and desolation spread.
The ancient quest for wisdom has become a matter of desperate urgency. It is hardly
too much to say that the future of the world is at stake. But how can such a quest
possibly meet with success? Wisdom, surely, is not something that we can learn and
teach, as a part of our normal education, in schools and universities?
This is my great discovery! Wisdom can be learnt and taught in schools and
universities. It must be so learnt and taught. Wisdom is indeed the proper fundamental
objective for the whole of the academic enterprise: to help humanity learn how to nurture
and create a wiser world.
But how do we go about creating a kind of education, research and scholarship that
really will help us learn wisdom? Would not any such attempt destroy what is of value in
what we have at present, and just produce hot air, hypocrisy, vanity and nonsense? Or
worse, dogma and religious fundamentalism? What, in any case, is wisdom? Is not all
this just an abstract philosophical fantasy?
The answer, as I have already said, lies locked away in what may seem a highly
improbably place: science! This will seem especially improbable to many of those most
aware of environmental issues, and most suspicious of the role of modern science and
technology in modern life. How can science contain the methodological key to wisdom
when it is precisely this science that is behind so many of our current troubles? But a
crucial point must be noted. Modern scientific and technological research has met with
absolutely astonishing, unprecedented success, as long as this success is interpreted
narrowly, in terms of the production of expert knowledge and technological know-how.
Doubts may be expressed about whether humanity as a whole has made progress towards
well being or happiness during the last century or so. But there can be no serious doubt
whatsoever that science has made staggering intellectual progress in increasing expert
knowledge and know-how, during such a period. It is this astonishing intellectual
progress that makes science such a powerful but double-edged tool, for good and for bad.
3At once the question arises: Can we learn from the intellectual progress of science how
to achieve progress in other fields of human endeavour? Is scientific progress exportable,
as it were, to other areas of life? More precisely, can the progress-achieving methods of
science be generalized so that they become fruitful for other worthwhile, problematic
human endeavours, in particular the supremely worthwhile, supremely problematic
endeavour of creating a good and wise world?
My great idea – that this can indeed be done – is not entirely new (as I was to learn
after making my discovery). It goes back to the 18th century Enlightenment. This was
indeed the key idea of the Enlightenment, especially the French Enlightenment: to learn
from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world.
And the philosophes of the Enlightenment, men such as Voltaire, Diderot and Condorcet,
did what they could to put this magnificent, profound idea into practice in their lives.
They fought dictatorial power, superstition, and injustice with weapons no more lethal
than those of argument and wit. They gave their support to the virtues of tolerance,
openness to doubt, readiness to learn from criticism and from experience. Courageously
and energetically they laboured to promote reason and enlightenment in personal and
social life.
Unfortunately, in developing the Enlightenment idea intellectually, the philosophes
blundered. They botched the job. They developed the Enlightenment idea in a
profoundly defective form, and it is this immensely influential, defective version of the
idea, inherited from the 18th century, which may be called the "traditional"
Enlightenment, that is built into early 21st century institutions of inquiry. Our current
traditions and institutions of learning, when judged from the standpoint of helping us
learn how to become more enlightened, are defective and irrational in a wholesale and
structural way, and it is this which, in the long term, sabotages our efforts to create a
more civilized world, and prevents us from avoiding the kind of horrors we have been
exposed to during the last century.
The task before us is thus not that of creating a kind of inquiry devoted to improving
wisdom out of the blue, as it were, with nothing to guide us except two and a half
thousand years of failed philosophical discussion. Rather, the task is the much more
straightforward, practical and well-defined one of correcting the structural blunders built
into academic inquiry inherited from the Enlightenment. We already have a kind of
academic inquiry designed to help us learn wisdom. The problem is that the design is
lousy. It is, as I have said, a botched job. It is like a piece of engineering that kills
people because of faulty design – a bridge that collapses, or an aeroplane that falls out of
the sky. A quite specific task lies before us: to diagnose the blunders we have inherited
from the Enlightenment, and put them right. 5
So here, briefly, is the diagnosis. The philosophes of the 18th century assumed,
understandably enough, that the proper way to implement the Enlightenment programme
was to develop social science alongside natural science. Francis Bacon had already
stressed the importance of improving knowledge of the natural world in order to achieve
social progress. The philosophes generalized this, holding that it is just as important to
improve knowledge of the social world. Thus the philosophes set about creating the
social sciences: history, anthropology, political economy, psychology, sociology.
This had an immense impact. Throughout the 19th century the diverse social sciences
were developed, often by non-academics, in accordance with this Enlightenment idea.
4Gradually, universities took notice of these developments until, by the mid 20th century,
all the diverse branches of the social sciences, as conceived of by the Enlightenment,
were built into the institutional structure of universities as recognized academic
disciplines.
The outcome is what we have today, knowledge-inquiry as we may call it, a kind of
inquiry devoted in the first instance to the pursuit of knowledge.
But, from the standpoint of creating a kind of inquiry designed to help humanity learn
how to become enlightened and civilized, which was the original idea, all this amounts to
a series of monumental blunders.
In order to implement properly the basic Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific
progress how to achieve social progress towards a civilized world, it is essential to get the
following three things right.
1. The progress-achieving methods of science need to be correctly identified.
2. These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they become fruitfully
applicable to any worthwhile, problematic human endeavour, whatever the aims
may be, and not just applicable to the one endeavour of acquiring knowledge.
3. The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then need to be exploited
correctly in the great human endeavour of trying to make social progress towards
an enlightened, civilized world.
Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three points wrong. They
failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of natural science; they failed
to generalize these methods properly; and, most disastrously of all, they failed to apply
them properly so that humanity might learn how to become civilized by rational means.
Instead of seeking to apply the progress-achieving methods of science, after having been
appropriately generalized, to the task of creating a better world, the philosophes applied
scientific method to the task of creating social science. Instead of trying to make social
progress towards an enlightened world, they set about making scientific progress in
knowledge of social phenomena. That the philosophes made these blunders in the 18th
century is forgivable; what is unforgivable is that these blunders still remain
unrecognized and uncorrected today, over two centuries later. Instead of correcting them,
we have allowed our institutions of learning to be shaped by them as they have developed
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, so that now the blunders are an all-pervasive
feature of our world.
The Enlightenment, and what it led to, has long been criticized, by the Romantic
movement, by what Isaiah Berlin has called 'the counter-Enlightenment', and more
recently by the Frankfurt school, by postmodernists and others. But these standard
objections are, from my point of view, entirely missing the point. In particular, my idea
is the very opposite of all those anti-rationalist, romantic and postmodernist views which
object to the way the Enlightenment gives far too great an importance to natural science
and to scientific rationality. My discovery is that what is wrong with the traditional
Enlightenment, and the kind of academic inquiry we now possess derived from it –
knowledge-inquiry – is not too much 'scientific rationality' but, on the contrary, not
enough. It is the glaring, wholesale irrationality of contemporary academic inquiry,
when judged from the standpoint of helping humanity learn how to become more
civilized, that is the problem.
5But, the cry will go up, wisdom has nothing to do with reason. And reason has nothing
to do with wisdom. On the contrary! It is just such an item of conventional ‘wisdom’
that my great idea turns on its head. Once both reason and wisdom have been rightly
understood, and the irrationality of academic inquiry as it exists at present has been
appreciated, it becomes obvious that it is precisely reason that we need to put into
practice in our personal, social, institutional and global lives if our lives, at all these
levels, are to become imbued with a bit more wisdom. We need, in short, a new, more
rigorous kind of inquiry which has, as its basic task, to seek and promote wisdom. We
may call this new kind of inquiry wisdom-inquiry.
But what is wisdom? This is how I define it in From Knowledge to Wisdom, a book
published some years ago now, in 1984, in which I set out my ‘great idea’ in some detail:
“[wisdom is] the desire, the active endeavour, and the capacity to discover and
achieve what is desirable and of value in life, both for oneself and for others. Wisdom
includes knowledge and understanding but goes beyond them in also including: the
desire and active striving for what is of value, the ability to see what is of value,
actually and potentially, in the circumstances of life, the ability to experience value,
the capacity to use and develop knowledge, technology and understanding as needed
for the realization of value. Wisdom, like knowledge, can be conceived of, not only
in personal terms, but also in institutional or social terms. We can thus interpret
[wisdom-inquiry] as asserting: the basic task of rational inquiry is to help us
develop wiser ways of living, wiser institutions, customs and social relations, a wiser
world.”6
What, then, are the three blunders of the Enlightenment, still built into the
intellectual/institutional structure of academia?
First, the philosophes failed to capture correctly the progress-achieving methods of
natural science. From D’Alembert in the 18th century to Karl Popper in the 20th, the
widely held view, amongst both scientists and philosophers, has been (and continues to
be) that science proceeds by assessing theories impartially in the light of evidence, no
permanent assumption being accepted by science about the universe independently of
evidence. Preference may be given to simple, unified or explanatory theories, but not in
such a way that nature herself is, in effect, assumed to be simple, unified or
comprehensible.
This orthodox view, which I call standard empiricism is, however, untenable. If taken
literally, it would instantly bring science to a standstill. For, given any accepted
fundamental theory of physics, T, Newtonian theory say, or quantum theory, endlessly
many empirically more successful rivals can be concocted which agree with T about
observed phenomena but disagree arbitrarily about some unobserved phenomena, and
successfully predict phenomena, in an ad hoc way, that T makes false predictions about,
or no predictions. Physics would be drowned in an ocean of such empirically more
successful rival theories.
In practice, these rivals are excluded because they are disastrously disunified. Two
considerations govern acceptance of theories in physics: empirical success and unity. In
demanding unity, we demand of a fundamental physical theory that it ascribes the same
dynamic laws to the phenomena to which the theory applies.7 But in persistently
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even more, empirically successful, physics makes a big persistent assumption about the
universe. The universe is such that all disunified theories are false. It has some kind of
unified dynamic structure. It is physically comprehensible in the sense that explanations
for phenomena exist to be discovered.
But this untestable (and thus metaphysical) assumption that the universe is physically
comprehensible is profoundly problematic. Science is obliged to assume, but does not
know, that the universe is comprehensible. Much less does it know that the universe is
comprehensible in this or that way. A glance at the history of physics reveals that ideas
have changed dramatically over time. In the 17th century there was the idea that the
universe consists of corpuscles, minute billiard balls, which interact only by contact.
This gave way to the idea that the universe consists of point-particles surrounded by
rigid, spherically symmetrical fields of force, which in turn gave way to the idea that
there is one unified self-interacting field, varying smoothly throughout space and time.
Nowadays we have the idea that everything is made up of minute quantum strings
embedded in ten or eleven dimensions of space-time. Some kind of assumption along
these lines must be made but, given the historical record, and given that any such
assumption concerns the ultimate nature of the universe, that of which we are most
ignorant, it is only reasonable to conclude that it is almost bound to be false.
The way to overcome this fundamental dilemma inherent in the scientific enterprise is
to construe physics as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the
comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions asserting less and
less as one goes up the hierarchy, and thus becoming more and more likely to be true, and
more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be
possible at all. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed
assumptions and associated methods is created within which much more substantial and
problematic assumptions and associated methods can be changed, and indeed improved,
as scientific knowledge improves. Put another way, a framework of relatively unspecific,
unproblematic, fixed aims and methods is created within which much more specific and
problematic aims and methods evolve as scientific knowledge evolves. There is positive
feedback between improving knowledge, and improving aims-and-methods, improving
knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge. This is the nub of scientific rationality,
the methodological key to the unprecedented success of science. Science adapts its
nature to what it discovers about the nature of the universe. Philosophy of science (the
study of the aims and methods of science) becomes an integral, vital part of science itself.
And science becomes much more like natural philosophy in the time of Newton, a
synthesis of science, methodology, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy.
This hierarchical conception of physics, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, can
readily be generalized to take into account problematic assumptions associated with the
aims of science having to with values, and the social uses or applications of science. It
can be generalized so as to apply to the different branches of natural science. Different
sciences have different specific aims, and so different specific methods although,
throughout natural science there is the common meta-methodology of aim-oriented
empiricism.
So much for the first blunder of the traditional Enlightenment, and how to put it right.8
7Second, having failed to identify the methods of science correctly, the philosophes
naturally failed to generalize these methods properly. They failed to appreciate that the
idea of representing the problematic aims (and associated methods) of science in the form
of a hierarchy can be generalized and applied fruitfully to other worthwhile enterprises
besides science. Many other enterprises have problematic aims – problematic because
aims conflict, and because what we seek may be unrealizable, undesirable, or both. Such
enterprises, with problematic aims, would benefit from employing a hierarchical
methodology, generalized from that of science, thus making it possible to improve aims
and methods as the enterprise proceeds. There is the hope that, as a result of exploiting in
life methods generalized from those employed with such success in science, some of the
astonishing success of science might be exported into other worthwhile human
endeavours, with problematic aims quite different from those of science.
Third, and most disastrously of all, the philosophes failed completely to try to apply
such generalized, hierarchical progress-achieving methods to the immense, and
profoundly problematic enterprise of making social progress towards an enlightened,
wise world. The aim of such an enterprise is notoriously problematic. For all sorts of
reasons, what constitutes a good world, an enlightened, wise or civilized world, attainable
and genuinely desirable, must be inherently and permanently problematic. Here, above
all, it is essential to employ the generalized version of the hierarchical, progress-
achieving methods of science, designed specifically to facilitate progress when basic aims
are problematic. It is just this that the philosophes failed to do. Instead of
applying the hierarchical methodology to social life, the philosophes sought to apply a
seriously defective conception of scientific method to social science, to the task of
making progress towards, not a better world, but to better knowledge of social
phenomena. And this ancient blunder, developed throughout the 19th century by J.S.
Mill, Karl Marx and many others, and built into academia in the early 20th century with
the creation of the diverse branches of the social sciences in universities all over the
world, is still built into the institutional and intellectual structure of academia today,
inherent in the current character of social science.
Properly implemented, in short, the Enlightenment idea of learning from scientific
progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened world would involve
developing social inquiry, not primarily as social science, but rather as social
methodology, or social philosophy. A basic task would be to get into personal and social
life, and into other institutions besides that of science – into government, industry,
agriculture, commerce, the media, law, education, international relations – hierarchical,
progress-achieving methods (designed to improve problematic aims) arrived at by
generalizing the methods of science. A basic task for academic inquiry as a whole would
be to help humanity learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just,
cooperatively rational ways than at present. The fundamental intellectual and
humanitarian aim of inquiry would be to help humanity acquire wisdom – wisdom being,
as I have already indicated, the capacity to realize (apprehend and create) what is of value
in life, for oneself and others.
One outcome of getting into social and institutional life the kind of aim-evolving,
hierarchical methodology indicated above, generalized from science, is that it becomes
possible for us to develop and assess rival philosophies of life as a part of social life,
somewhat as theories are developed and assessed within science. Such a hierarchical
8methodology provides a framework within which competing views about what our aims
and methods in life should be – competing religious, political and moral views – may be
cooperatively assessed and tested against broadly agreed, unspecific aims (high up in the
hierarchy of aims) and the experience of personal and social life. There is the possibility of
cooperatively and progressively improving such philosophies of life (views about what is of
value in life and how it is to be achieved) much as theories are cooperatively and progressively
improved in science.
Wisdom-inquiry, because of its greater rigour, has intellectual standards that are, in
important respects, different from those of knowledge-inquiry. Whereas knowledge-
inquiry demands that emotions and desires, values, human ideals and aspirations,
philosophies of life be excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry, wisdom-inquiry
requires that they be included. In order to discover what is of value in life it is essential
that we attend to our feelings and desires. But not everything we desire is desirable, and
not everything that feels good is good. Feelings, desires and values need to be subjected
to critical scrutiny. And of course feelings, desires and values must not be permitted to
influence judgements of factual truth and falsity.
Wisdom-inquiry embodies a synthesis of traditional Rationalism and Romanticism. It
includes elements from both, and it improves on both. It incorporates Romantic ideals of
integrity, having to do with motivational and emotional honesty, honesty about desires
and aims; and at the same time it incorporates traditional Rationalist ideals of integrity,
having to do with respect for objective fact, knowledge, and valid argument. Traditional
Rationalism takes its inspiration from science and method; Romanticism takes its
inspiration from art, from imagination, and from passion. Wisdom-inquiry holds art to
have a fundamental rational role in inquiry, in revealing what is of value, and unmasking
false values; but science, too, is of fundamental importance. What we need, for wisdom,
is an interplay of sceptical rationality and emotion, an interplay of mind and heart, so that
we may develop mindful hearts and heartfelt minds (as I put it in my first book What’s
Wrong With Science?). It is time we healed the great rift in our culture, so graphically
depicted by C. P. Snow.9
The revolution we require – intellectual, institutional and cultural – if it ever comes
about, will be comparable in its long-term impact to that of the Renaissance, the scientific
revolution, or the Enlightenment. The outcome will be traditions and institutions of
learning rationally designed to help us realize what is of value in life. There are a few
scattered signs that this intellectual revolution, from knowledge to wisdom, is already
under way.10 It will need, however, much wider cooperative support – from scientists,
scholars, students, research councils, university administrators, vice chancellors, teachers,
the media and the general public – if it is to become anything more than what it is at
present, a fragmentary and often impotent movement of protest and opposition, often at
odds with itself, exercising little influence on the main body of academic work. I can
hardly imagine any more important work for anyone associated with academia than, in
teaching, learning and research, to help promote this revolution.
Childhood
It may be thought that my idea that I can publish a few books and articles, give a few
lectures, and thereby, single-handedly as it were, transform the entire academic
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project come from?
It all goes back to my childhood. For as far back as I can remember, I seem to have
found the world baffling, mysterious and frightening. Above all I was terrified by the
black inevitability of death. From the age of four, I was haunted by problems of war,
theology, cosmology, physics, consciousness, epistemology, and the meaning of life.
One night, when I was three years old, during the early stages of the second world war,
the German Luftwaffe dropped bombs in a field not so very far from our house. Later that
night I paced to and fro in my parents' bedroom, my hands deep in my dressing gown
pockets, my head bowed in thought. Finally, I stopped, turned to my parents, and asked:
"Mummy, why do they have wars?" Today, I am proud of my three year old self for
asking that good question.
Around the same time, I entered into a fierce theological debate with the boy next door.
He was trying to convince me of the existence of God. “If God doesn't exist" he argued
"who do you think made the earth? Who made the trees? Who made the stars?" I listened
to this litany of questions in silence for a while, and then asked in turn: "And who made
God?" The boy next door went away without giving me an answer.
A little later, when I was four, I got interested in natural philosophy and cosmology. I
invented a theory as to why the sky is blue. According to this theory, the sky is blue
because air is very, very slightly blue. When you look at things close to, the blueness of
the air is too slight to be noticed, but when you look at the sky, you see through so much
air that the blueness is easy to see. I can remember trying to convince my father of this
explanation for the blueness of the sky – and I remember my exasperation when, for
some extraordinary reason, he remained unconvinced.
I also remember lying awake in bed one summer evening at this time, puzzling about
how space can come to an end. It occurred to me that far away in the sky there must be a
vast wall that marks the outer boundary of everything. For a while, this seemed to me to
be a satisfactory enough solution to the problem. And then I had the awful thought: But
what is behind the wall? Something must be behind the wall!
About a year later, when I was about five, I made the extraordinary discovery of self-
consciousness. I had had a row with my mother. She wanted me and my sister to go for
a walk. I protested. “It will rain”, I declared, pointing to some dark clouds. Off my
mother and sister went, leaving me behind. Feeling somewhat resentful and self-
righteous, alone in the house, it began to dawn on me that I had something infinitely
precious and mysterious that no one else had: my own awareness of myself, my inner
secret thoughts and feelings.
A year later, by the age of six, my passion for natural philosophy was well aroused.
One day, I asked my father how it was possible to make tubes as small as those in the
filaments of electric light bulbs, so that electricity could flow through. My father
explained that the filaments, like all electric wires, are solid metal. At first I was furiously
indignant: how could electricity possibly flow through solid metal? But when it became
clear that my father really did know what he was talking about, I fell silent, stupefied by
this mystery of electricity flowing through solid metal. Electricity took on for me a
quality that was both fascinating and nightmarish. I knew it was dangerous, and could
kill. I had been told that in an unused, upper story of our house, firmly out of bounds,
there were uninsulated "live" wires. I imagined "live" wires lashing out, dealing out their
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terrible sting of electric death. On one occasion a girl visiting for the day, much older
than me (she was eight or nine years old) persuaded me, against my better judgment, to
put my finger into the empty socket of a table lamp. She assured me that it was perfectly
safe, and that I would not feel a thing. In fact I received a shock – fortunately only
through the tip of my finger. Here, then, was the violent rushing pain and mystery of
electricity, experienced at first hand. From a cautious distance, I would contemplate the
transformer in our garden, hidden behind some bushes, softly humming to itself, quietly
containing its secret, deadly power. At about this time, I began to take torches and
batteries to pieces to try to discover how they worked.
One day while in the garden, I made what seemed to me to be a wonderful discovery. I
discovered a reason for believing in the existence of atoms. If atoms did not exist – I felt
rather than thought – and matter remained exactly the same, however minutely it might
be subdivided, then there could exist nothing to fix the size of things. Things could be
any size. But things are not any size: somehow, people, animals, plants do know roughly
what size to be. Therefore atoms of some kind or other, of a definite size, must exist, to
fix the size of everything else.
I found this argument entirely convincing, although not for one moment did I suppose
it would convince anyone else. Indeed, the dramatic and extraordinary discovery that I
felt I had made was, at the time, wholly private, uncommunicable, beyond words, my
own personal wordless recognition of the force of the argument that I have here spelled
out in words, a feeling rather than a thought. I did not imagine at the time that an insight
so emotional and personal could be put into words, and thus be rendered open to public
understanding and scrutiny.
Also, at about this time (around the age of five or six), I discovered for myself the
problem of perception. I was sitting on the sofa in the living room, and I began to think
about what was going on as I looked about me at objects in the room. I thought about the
light which was reflected from tables, chairs, the walls of the room, and which then
entered my eyes to cause me to have the experience of seeing. What I was really seeing,
it seemed, was the light entering my eyes, not the furniture around me. Here was the sofa,
the carpet, the table, wholly visible and obvious before me. And yet, it seemed, I could
not possibly be seeing these things. I could only really see what happens when light
enters my eyes. This room I was seeing must somehow be inside my head – and yet it
could not possibly be inside my head! The more I thought about it the more horrible the
problem became. Mentally, if not physically, I was staggering about the room, clutching
my head, tearing out my hair, bewildered beyond belief.
In recounting these childhood discoveries (in the main discoveries of problems rather
than of solutions to problems), I am perhaps in part just boasting, in a rather foolish and
shameful way. Certainly, I am today absurdly proud of these childhood discoveries of
mine: I tremble to think of how I may subsequently have squandered the early passionate
intellectual curiosity and independence these discoveries reveal. But in another way, I
am not boasting at all. All of us, I believe, are extraordinarily active and creative
intellectually when we are very young. Bryan Magee gives a vivid, dramatic account of
similar philosophical discoveries that he made when young.11 Somehow, in the first few
years of life, we acquire an identity, a consciousness of self; we discover, or create, a
whole view of the world, a cosmology; and we learn to understand speech, and to speak
ourselves. And we achieve all this without any formal education whatsoever. Compared
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with these mighty intellectual achievements of our childhood, the heights of adult artistic
and scientific achievement all but fade into insignificance. It is reasonable to suppose
that there is a biological, a neurological, basis for our extraordinary capacity to learn
when we are very young. It probably has to do with the fact that our brains are still
growing during the first few years of our life. It is striking that there are things that can
only be learnt during this time. If we have not had the opportunity to learn to speak by the
age of twelve, we will never really learn to speak. Lightning calculators all begin to
acquire their extraordinary arithmetical skills when very young. Some things it seems
become too difficult for us to learn as we grow older. In our early childhood we are
forced, by our situation, to be creative philosophers and metaphysicians, preoccupied by
fundamental issues. One only has to think of the endless questioning of young children
to appreciate something of their insatiable hunger to know, to understand.
The tragedy is that formal education fails so dismally to recognize, and to help nourish,
this frenzy of childish curiosity. At school we are expected to learn up items of human
knowledge – solutions to other people's problems. It is rather rare to be told about, or to
be asked to consider – let alone to be encouraged to wrestle with – the problems which
gave rise to these solutions: and yet only this can enable us to make rational sense of the
solutions themselves. It is even rarer to be asked to articulate our own problems, and our
ideas as to how they might be solved. Worst of all, much education, unintentionally,
makes us ashamed of our own intellectual integrity and creativity. At school a premium is
placed on being able to understand quickly, and remember. We thus tend to grow
ashamed of what we take to be our "stupidity" – our inability to understand, our
puzzlement, our incomprehension. And yet it is precisely here, in our inability to
understand, our sensitivity to the existence of problems, that our real intelligence and
integrity lie. In prompting us to disown our inner stupidity, our lingering sense of
bafflement, education encourages us to disown the precious core of our mind.
The result is that we come to devalue and forget our childhood discoveries. We do not
appreciate even that the discovery of a problem can be a great intellectual achievement.
We do not learn how to translate feelings of bafflement into articulated questions, into
public words: and so memory of the bafflement is lost.12
The Physical Universe
By the time I was eight, my parents had decided, perhaps with a touch of amusement,
that I was to be a "scientist”. In those days, at the end of the second world war, to be a
scientist was considered to be a highly desirable and honourable profession to aspire to –
for a boy at least, and if only one was clever enough. In our family, however, science
carried with it no special status or prestige: that went rather to literature, to the arts, to the
creative and fulfilling life. But as far as I was concerned, it was not any kind of
profession that was on my mind at all. My ambition, quite simply, was to solve the
ultimate riddle, understand the ultimate nature of the universe, the nature of existence.
To live and to die, and not know what kind of world this is, what it all means, seemed to
me then, at the age of about eight, to be a fate too terrible to think of. Yet this,
unfortunately, was the fate of everyone who had lived up till now. No one, I was
convinced, had ever had the faintest idea of the true nature of the cosmos, the true inner
meaning of it all. Most people were not even aware of the disaster of their ignorance.
They lived and died unaware of the tragic triviality and irrelevance of their lives. Life
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could only acquire its real meaning if one could clearly see and know. I had no choice: I
must know and understand, as a matter of necessity. Where everyone else had failed, I
must succeed. And when I discovered the great secret of the inner nature of the universe,
I would reveal it to mankind, and be loved for ever.
At the age of ten, fired by this mighty and terrible ambition – in effect to become the
saviour of mankind – I plunged into the study of nuclear physics! I devoured the contents
of Science News 2 (1947), which was devoted entirely to an informal account of nuclear
energy and the bomb, with contributions from Peierls, Bethe, Teller, Frisch and others. I
understood enough to be worried about the possibility that an atomic bomb, exploded in
the ocean, might turn the earth into another sun. In the great heat and pressure of the sun,
I read, atoms of heavy hydrogen combine to form helium, a reaction that causes the sun
to shine. If it happens there, I thought, it could happen here as well. And quite apart
from that horror, there was the possibility of atomic war to think about. I made anxious
calculations about our chances of survival if a bomb was dropped on Truro or Bodmin,
living as we did on the north coast of Cornwall. Exploration of the inner secrets of
nature brought with it, it seemed, both wonder and terror.
A year later I plunged into the study of relativity and quantum theory. With fascinated
incomprehension I read Bertrand Russell's ABC of Relativity and Eddington's The Nature
of the Physical Universe. I learned that as we move more quickly, we shrink, time goes
more slowly, and we become more massive. Gravitation is simply the curvature of
space-time. Everything is made up of electrons, protons and neutrons; but these
fundamental entities, even though particles, are also, in some utterly mystifying way,
wave-like in character as well, waves of probability. As a result of the investigations of
science, the solid and prosaic world around us is revealed to be something utterly
different, a place of dark miracles and mystery. It was above all my imagination that was
appealed to by the utter strangeness of this world disclosed to us by modern physics.
And buried within this mystery, this jabberwocky world, lay the solution to the enigma of
existence. My intentions were, it seemed, becoming clearer. I would be a theoretical
physicist, and discover the solution to the ultimate riddle of existence.
Around this time I read my first book of philosophy: W.A. Sinclair’s An Introduction
to Philosophy. This I read with interest, struck especially by the brief account of Hume's
argument concerning the impossibility of knowing for sure that the sun will rise
tomorrow, however many times it may have risen regularly in the past, and however
firmly our most successful scientific theories might predict the occurrence. I realized,
embarrassed, that I had somehow supposed that the authoritative body of scientists must
be in a position to know such an obvious fact about the world in a way which placed it
beyond all doubt – the universe, as it were, not daring to disobey the weighty judgement
of the adult world. How absurd! Of course it could not be like that. It must of course
always be possible for the universe to surprise people, however convinced they might be
that this could not occur, however stiff and dignified they might be with certainty. I felt
ashamed of my gullibility, and also interested that such an elementary argument could
have such scope, such power to change the way one viewed things.
On the whole, however, I was not very impressed with philosophy. At the time, and
for some years afterwards, it struck me as a game rather than as something serious. Not
for one moment did I suppose that the solution to the mystery of existence, which I
sought, could lie hidden in something as feeble as philosophy.
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None of this, by the way, should be taken to mean that I was horribly precocious. Not
at all. In those far off days in England, 11 year olds had to take an exam which decided
whether they would be able to go on to grammar school or not. Failure to pass this exam
more or less condemned you to leaving school without qualifications (unless your parents
could pay for your education). I failed this crucial exam, not once, but twice!
The Human World
Then, with the arrival of the traumas, ecstasies and disasters of adolescence, I began to
feel it was much more important to understand the hearts and souls of people, and the
way to do that was by means of the novel. Instead of reading Jeans, Eddington, and Fred
Hoyle, I plunged into the worlds of Dostoevsky, Jane Austen, Henry Fielding, Chekhov,
Stendhal, D.H. Lawrence, Kafka, Virginia Woolf, Scott Fitzgerald, Thomas Mann,
Tolstoy, Balzac, George Orwell, Turgenev, Conrad, Thomas Hardy, Ibsen, James Joyce,
Mauriac, Bernard Shaw, George Eliot, Emile Bronte. I read The Brothers Karamazov in
two days, emerging briefly, dazed and battered, from that turbulent and tortured world
into thin reality for a bite to eat at lunch and supper. One afternoon I took a slim book
by an unknown author up to my bedroom to read at a sitting; I was so astonished by its
contents that I returned it hurriedly to the bookshelf, making sure no one noticed, as if
the book were an obscene publication. It was Kafka's Metamorphosis. I hunted for
books which would open up new worlds, so intensely imagined and so truthful that they
would seem more vivid, more dense and real than the real world itself. What I wanted
was not just the accurate depiction of this world, but the creation of a new, strange world
experienced as reality. I marvelled at the early pages of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves,
Kafka's The Trial, Emily Brontë’s Wuthering Heights, Dostoevsky’s The Idiot and The
Brothers Karamazov. Science fiction was for me only a cheap thrill. I read H.G. Wells'
The Time Machine, and Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, gripped and fascinated:
but for me neither book even began to engage in the proper task of the novel. What I
sought was an exploration of the realities of human experience and emotion that was so
truthful, so searching and profound, that we are led when we encounter it into a new
vision of reality, a vision before only dimly and fleetingly sensed, so that we encounter it
now in an overwhelming way as both strange and familiar, a wide awake dream. It
occurs to me now that what I wanted was to be shown a world that was both as real and
as mysterious as the universe of modern physics; but the reality and the mystery should
lie in the human mind and heart, in our inner lives, and only incidentally, as it were, in
any rearranging of the outer cosmic order. It was as if I believed reality must be utterly
mysterious – whether the reality of the physical universe, or the reality of the human
soul. Something of this I found in Kafka, and in Dostoevsky – and later on in Strindberg,
and in the best films of Ingmar Bergman. And of course it is to be found in Shakespeare.
And in Beckett.
My great ambition was transformed. By the age of fifteen I had no doubts, I would
become a novelist. Clear sighted and unflinching, I would journey into the depths of the
human heart and mind, into that cauldron of desire and terror, fantasy and nightmare we
often pretend does not exist. I would capture the very essence of what it is to be
conscious and alive – the intense inner feeling of ourself which we all know but do not
know how to express. I would come up with the true inner meaning and value of our
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lives, the precious essence of life. And the novels I would write would be revelations of
these inner realities – so intense, vivid and dramatic as to be more real than reality itself.
My parents, however, insisted that, first, I must go to University, to secure my future
economically (of no significance to me at all at the age of 17). The educational system,
fiercely classificatory in those days, had labelled me "science" and not "humanities".
(And in any case I knew doing English at University would ruin any chance I might have
of becoming a novelist.) I had read Eddington, who informed me that physics is really
mathematics, and for a time, earlier, I had been dazzled by this invisible, esoteric world
of mathematics. So off I went to University College London to do mathematics,
convinced I could write my novels between and after lectures.
But I was miserable; I didn't know what to write about; and mathematics seemed both
hollow and very difficult. It did not seem to be about anything. I passed all my exams but,
abruptly, in my second year, my grant was stopped because I had not attended enough
lectures.
So I left and did my National Service in Bielefeld, Germany. I became a Sergeant in
the Educational Corps. And then I went to Manchester University to do Philosophy. I had
failed miserably as a physicist, and as a novelist, but I was interested in philosophical
problems, so I would do that for three years, and then join the grey shuffle of ordinary,
uncreative life (as I then saw it).
But before I plunge into an account of what happened as a result of going to
Manchester, there is one other influence from my childhood that I must mention. The
household god was Sigmund Freud. My mother had been psychoanalysed. Freud
informed her vision of the world. But what I learned from her about Freud I found
deeply disturbing. If my unconscious controlled my actions, this meant I was not in
control. Free will was an illusion. Freud had to be refuted. But there did seem to be
something to Freudianism. All too often what was supposed to be going on in human
affairs seemed to me to be at odds with what was really going on. I decided the only way
to refute Freud was never to deny an interpretation of my actions, motivations and
feelings, however devastating that interpretation might be. As a result, my unconscious
would gradually become conscious, and I would regain control of my actions and my life.
Perhaps my adoption of this strategy to refute Freud accounts at least in part for the
excesses that are to follow.13
Manchester University
At Manchester, in the first year, there were just two courses, both introductory: logic
and philosophy. While still in Germany, I knew I would be doing something called
“symbolic logic” at Manchester, but I had no idea what it was, and there were no books
available to tell me. If I was to find out what it was, I was going to have to reinvent it
myself. So I got hold of a big yellow army exercise book, and filled it with my efforts to
reinvent symbolic logic. For months, I struggled to put Aristotelian logic into symbolic
form, but got nowhere.
Then, at Manchester, I was introduced to the propositional calculus, and I was
enchanted. It had never occurred to me to develop symbolic logic in such a fashion. The
others doing the course were bored, but I was entranced and alive with questions. This
episode came to dramatize for me what is so tragically wrong with so much education, at
all levels. Our heads are stuffed with solutions to problems. Rarely are we told what the
15
problems are, in the first place – something we need to know to be able to assess, for
ourselves, how adequate the proposed solutions are. Rarely indeed are we given the
opportunity to struggle ourselves to attempt to solve fundamental intellectual problems –
not with the idea that we might solve them, but simply to bring them to life, and to enable
us to appreciate the wonder of the solution – if solution it be. Introductory courses in
symbolic logic do not ask students to invent the subject. Almost never is a course
organized around a major, open, unsolved problem – background knowledge and skills
being acquired along the way, as a part of the effort to improve understanding of the
problem and how it is to be tackled and perhaps, one day, solved.
The other course, introducing philosophy, I found less interesting. This was partly
because I already had a background in philosophy, having earlier read works by G. E.
Moore, Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer and others, and having thought about philosophical
problems for years, without quite realizing it. But – perhaps for this reason – it turned
out I was rather good at philosophy. At last, something I could do!
As my first year at Manchester came to an end, I became nightmarishly obsessed with
two philosophical problems: the mind/body problem, and Hume’s problem of induction. I
threw my mind into a torment in connection with the first of these problems: how could a
mere brain, a conglomeration of neurons and synaptic junctions, however vast and
intricately designed, give rise to consciousness, to inner experience, to thought, feelings
and perception, to our inner world? Was one to suppose that inner awareness arose as a
kind of smoke from functioning neurons and synapses? Inner experiences, thoughts and
feelings seem to be intrinsically and utterly different, in their very nature, from any
conceivable neurological process to be found in the brain: and yet it also seems absurd to
hold, with Descartes, that our inner experiences, our thoughts and feelings, are utterly
distinct from anything to be found in the brain, there being two distinct kinds of stuff in
the universe, the mental and the physical.
But as if this was not bad enough, there was also Hume’s problem to torment me: what
possible reason can there be for holding that things will continue in the future more or
less as they have done in the past? How can our knowledge of the present and past be
known to have any relevance for the character of the future? We cannot know anything
about the future until it is here, as the present, or departed into the past. At any moment,
for all that we can ever conceivably know, anything whatsoever may happen. We cannot
argue that in the past the future has resembled the past, and hence in the future too the
future will resemble the past, because this presupposes just what is at issue, namely that
the past is a reliable guide to the future. At any instant, for all we can ever know, a
teaspoon may become an elephant, or a daffodil an ocean, and it is just as sensible to hold
that the teaspoon will in the next second be an elephant as it is to hold it will continue to
be a teaspoon.
I found myself caught in a nightmare of contradictory impulses. On the one hand, the
whole problem posed by Hume was clearly absurd: there must be some simple way of
refuting Hume decisively. But I could not see what it could be. On the other hand, here I
was trying to refute Hume when what had so appealed to me about Hume's argument,
when I had first learnt of it as a child, was that it is absolutely correct, and beautifully
puts humanity's pretensions into proper perspective by demonstrating conclusively that
the natural world must always be in a position to surprise and confound the scientific
experts, however infallible they may claim their expertise to be. Hume’s argument
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deserves to be affirmed and celebrated as providing liberation from the tyranny of
expertise – and here was I, working against my instincts, furiously striving to demolish
this wonderful and valuable argument as an absurdity.
The Riddle of Our Desires
My obsession with these two problems congealed into black despair. I arrived
home for the Summer vacation. My despair, my sense of inner blackness, excluded
all thought of a holiday. I decided that I would write. It was now or never. I took a
job working in a factory during the day, and in the evenings, in a state of terror, I
began to write short stories in one notebook and, in a second one, I jotted down
thoughts and feelings just as they occurred to me – writing whatever I wanted to
write, free of the crushing burden of attempting to create literature. This latter
activity transformed my life. "The riddle of the universe", I wrote, "is the riddle of
our desires" (and twenty years later this became the central theme of What's Wrong
With Science?, From Knowledge to Wisdom, and much of my subsequent work).
What had I wanted? Pushed to the extreme of absurdity, I decided, to become God.
My desire to discover the ultimate nature of the physical universe and reveal it to
humanity so that everyone could know and understand the ultimate truth about our
world, our existence – what was this but the desire for omniscience, for
immortality, the desire to be God? Buried within the scientific enterprise, it
seemed, there were these passionate, desperate, absurd strivings – to acquire God-
like knowledge and understanding, God-like power, to become immortal, to
become God. And likewise my desire to be a writer of genius, chart the hidden
depths of the human heart, create worlds of experience more vivid and real than
reality itself, disclose for everyone to see the supreme inner meaning and value of
human life, the miracle of our existence – what was all this again but the desire to
be God? In literature too, it seemed, there were intense, desperate, concealed
longings for God-like status.
And all this was an awful mistake. In my desperate desire to be a genius, to be God, I
had lost sight of something infinitely more precious: to be myself. It was not the
impossibility of becoming God that struck home to me so forcefully, as I scribbled away
in my diary of thoughts and feelings, but rather the appalling and grotesque undesirability
of it. For me, infinitely more miraculous than being God was being myself – this unique
and extraordinary being which only I could be. In striving to become a genius, God, I had
been striving to destroy myself. I had never seen myself – such a small, humble, short-
lived phenomenon in cosmic history – as anything worth being, for its own sake. Now it
seemed infinitely precious. And I had the sense of a foetus inside me, my embryonic self,
frozen and withered from long neglect, now just beginning to stir, to grow, to feel and
see, utterly sensitive and naked to experience.
For the first time in my life I passionately desired to be myself. But what was I? I did
not know. It was a mystery. This long neglected, hitherto despised I was a stranger to me.
I had for so long trampled on myself in my desperate attempts to escape from myself into
becoming an immortal genius that I now did not know what my poor, trampled self could
be. At times I experienced terror as I felt myself ceasing to be.
I invented a theory. For the first months of our life, I decided, it must be that we do not
know how to divide up what there is into “me” and “not me”. There is simply
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"everything" – moving colours, sounds, feelings, pains and pleasures: a cosmos of
experience. Then we discover how to separate out "that which is me" from "that which is
not me": and we discover that we are a tiny, powerless being in a vast, all-powerful,
largely unknown, sometimes terrifying universe. Dimly we remember a time when we
were "everything", a time of blissful God-like status when the distinction between "me"
and "cosmos" did not exist. In some way, so it seems to us, we have been disinherited of
our rightful status in the scheme of things of being "everything". Without realizing what
we are doing, we devote the rest of our life, in one way or other, to striving to attain again
our original, proper status of being “everything". This is our due, our natural inheritance.
Two opposing strategies are adopted by people in their desperate struggles to become
"everything”. On the one hand people try to increase the size of the self, the minute "me",
in the mad hope that eventually it will swallow up the entire universe – or at least as
much of it as possible. Thus people strive to become more and more powerful, so that, by
conquest, they come to dominate more and more territory, more and more people – until,
eventually, pushed to the limit, the world itself quails before such all-commanding might.
Others strive to increase the size of their identity by possessing more and more,
enhancing the capacity to own by amassing wealth. Others seek to inherit the earth
through their children – their progeny peopling the universe. Others again strive to
become the universe by, quite literally, swallowing it up, obsessively and hopelessly
eating and eating in an attempt to turn all that is "not me" into "me". And others seek to
become the universe through science, through knowledge and understanding – the mind
possessing, and even becoming, what is known and understood, the knower swallowing
up and digesting even those vast cosmic tracts of space and time by knowing and
understanding them.
On the other hand there are people who adopt just the opposite strategy: they seek to
become "everything" by diminishing the self, the minute speck of "me", until it
disappears altogether and only "everything" remains. This is the strategy of the mystic,
who seeks the progressive annihilation of his self until it vanishes entirely, and there is
only God: abrupt, ecstatic, devastating mystical union with God. It is the strategy, more
generally, of all those Christians who strive to destroy their selfish self, strive to become
humble and selfless, so that their will may become no more than the will of God, the self
sunk into union with God by becoming a mere servant, a tool, a finger of God's purpose
and presence in the world. It is the strategy of all those who endeavour to abase and
annihilate their distinct identity before some vast "other", so that it becomes nothing but a
part of, a servant of the "other" – whether this be God, the Church, the Nation, the race,
the future, the people, or whatever. Even those who seek oblivion in alcohol, in drugs, in
trauma, in madness, the self-knowing self being obliterated beneath the "everything" of
sheer sensation and experience, adopt a version of the second strategy. The strategy is
adopted implicitly even by those suicides who hope that by destroying themselves, they
will become – everything: only the existence of the tiny self-knowing ego standing in the
way, it seems, of the grandeur of becoming the cosmos.
These two strategies – to swallow everything up, and to be swallowed up by
everything – on the face of it diametrically opposed, actually differ only in being
different means to the same end: to become at one with God, with Nature, with
Everything. Conquest and self-effacement, arrogance and humility, dominance and
submission, selfishness and selflessness, apparent complete opposites, are actually but
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two sides of the same coin. And we all, helplessly, without quite knowing what we are
doing, in our urgent hunger to find reality and fulfilment, throw ourselves into living out
our own particular version of one or other of the two strategies for life. The life-goal of
becoming at one with everything is of course the outcome of extending our actual life
goals to the extremity of infinity and insanity. Most of us massively curtail such a goal in
the light of what we deem to be possible in the given hard constraints of real life. Only a
minority of us, the insane, the mystics, the saints, the Hitlers and Stalins, can live out in
actual life the fantasy of being everything – everything of importance. Nevertheless our
wildest dreams and longings, projected to infinity, even if dismissed as childish or mad,
can still influence our actual goals in life, our actual life strategies. What we actually do
is the achievable residue of our infinite hopes. In our dream life we devote ourselves to
being at one with God; and in the constricting circumstances of our actual life this
becomes: to be head of the firm; to become blind drunk yet again; to publish yet another
scientific paper; to achieve promotion; to perform an act of selflessness, of self-
abnegation. Viewed from this perspective, our life is bound to seem frustrated and
absurd.
And all this – so my theory asserted – is tragically unnecessary, the outcome of an
awful mistake. It all rests on a grotesquely mistaken view of the nature of the self, a
mistaken view of the relationship between that which is "me" and that which is "not me".
Influenced by Christian conceptions of the soul, and the Cartesian conception of the
Mind, we are led to conceive of our identity as a bubble of mind stuff which floats
precariously within a vast, impersonal physical universe. It is not just that we discover
that we are not "everything", but only a tiny vulnerable body within an immense world
that is not us: worse still, we discover that we are not even our own body – our "me"
being no more than the intangible mind stuff of consciousness floating somehow within
the interstices of the brain. We are banished from the world, imprisoned within the
bubble of our mind, all that we experience being no more than moving images within the
bubble, caused by the utterly unknown, distinct physical world beyond, which will before
long, and with complete indifference, crush us out of existence. Holding as we do,
somewhere at the back of our mind, this nightmarish vision of being squashed up for life
within the bubble of our mind, separated and excluded for ever from the utterly distinct
world of Reality which lies beyond, we take up our mad life project of becoming at least
a part of Reality, either by trying to swallow it up, or by allowing it to swallow up us.
But this Cartesian picture of the relationship between "me", my consciousness, and
"that which is not me", the physical universe, is entirely wrong. That which is within us,
our inner conscious self, is just as unknown to us, just as much a mystery, as that which
lies without. The stuff of our inner experiences is as real and as mysterious as the stuff of
apple trees, stones, or sunlight. We are not this unknown inner world – anymore than we
are the outer world surrounding our bodies. We are the outcome of the interaction
between inner and outer worlds. We are as much the trees, the sky, the sounds of our
footsteps scrunching on gravel, the action of walking in the world, as we are our
experience of these things, located within our skull. Our identity is not made of mind
stuff, utterly distinct and separate from the material world: rather our identity is the
interaction between the world out there, and what lies within. Our identity is naked to the
world. We become what we see, and hear, and touch, and do.
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But as a result of conceiving ourselves to be utterly distinct from everything else, the
easy flow of identity between what is within and without is disrupted. Desperate,
hopeless attempts to become at one with Reality by trying either to swallow it up, or to
get it to swallow up us, only make matters worse. The clenched muscles of our identity
impose an even more restrictive barrier between our inner and outer worlds.
The crucial step is to recognize that there is a third way. In order to become ecstatically
at one with Reality, to as great an extent as we please, all we need to do is to relax our
clenched muscles of identity dividing off so artificially "me" from "not me", and we
discover ourselves in the easy interplay between what is within and without. We will
discover ourselves to be what we already are: a part, an aspect of, Reality. Strenuous,
hysterical and hopeless attempts to conquer or be conquered will fall by the wayside as
we participate in the miraculous richness of Being.
This was my theory. It contains the seeds of the ideas of my subsequent work. In an
emblematic but confused way, almost all the themes are there: emphasis on the need to
call into question the aims of science and the aims of life, and the importance of relating
the one to the other; the fundamental character of the problem "What is of value in life,
and how is it to be realized?"; the need to change philosophy so that it takes up as its
basic task to help us improve our solutions to this problem as we live; the importance of
trying to understand human life as we enjoy and suffer it, imbued with meaning and
value, as an integral part of the physical universe; the idea that experiential features are
real features of things out there in the world, all views which deny this, from Cartesian
dualism to physicalism, being wrong; the sense that being alive is a miracle – that which
is of supreme value in existence lying in the rich particularity of our lives here on earth.
There is of course much to criticize in my "theory". Indeed, I subjected it to fierce
criticism myself in ensuing years, and was able to develop my views as a result. But
when I first enunciated it, in the Summer of 1961, it came to me as a revelation, as a
solution to the riddle of existence. Not only did I believe passionately in my theory; I
lived it. What I thought of as my great discovery – that in order to realize what is of
supreme value in existence we need to forego attempts to possess, or become possessed,
and instead allow our self to emerge naturally as the interaction between unknown inner
and outer worlds – this great "theory" of mine was but the intellectual husk of what I
lived, what I experienced. In the space of a week or so, almost everything had changed.
My black despair had gone. I found myself a new person in a new world, vivid, dramatic,
sometimes terrifying. Now that for the first time in my life (so it seemed) I wanted to be
myself, but did not know what this unknown, mysterious thing "myself" could be, during
each day I found and lost myself a thousand times as I became and ceased to be what I
saw, felt, heard, did or became a part of. Every morning just before sunrise, I set off for a
long walk though the beautiful Hampshire countryside in which my parents' house was
situated. As the sun rose, it felt like the first day, the beginning of existence. Everything
was indescribably fresh. I was newly created: and being myself, whatever it might be,
seemed to be a wonder, something sacred. As I walked, I would lose myself in the
changing perspectives of trees, hedges, hills and sky: and the landscape would lose itself
in me. I experienced the dissolution of the barriers between "me" and "not me", so that at
times it seemed it was the landscape walking me though it, there being simply changing
perspectives of landscape. And then I would run, frightened that I was about to dissolve
away altogether, lose myself permanently to these trees, fields and sky, and go mad. And
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throughout the day I would find and lose myself in the changing circumstances of my
surroundings. In one of his letters John Keats remarks "if a sparrow were before my
window, I take part in its existence, and pick about the gravel". So it was with me. I
would meet two friends for five minutes conversation, and I would become this meeting,
this conversation. This would be everything, my whole identity. And when the meeting
came to an end, I would experience the terror of dissolution of self, until I found a new
self in what happened next. Whereas before I had been shut up in my solitary Cartesian
prison, utterly excluded from the real world, surrounded by the impersonal, unknown
physical universe, I was now released into a world rich in colour and drama, my identity
as much in things around me as in my body or brain, passionately and helplessly
becoming and ceasing to be the things I experienced. I can remember staring at a stalk of
grass: never had there been such vividly green grass; and this was not some object remote
from me about which I could only obtain distant, misleading clues through perception or
touch; as I stared at it I became it, or it became me. I knew the stalk of grass from within
itself.
And it was not just things that I met in this raw, absolute way; it happened with people
too. Whereas before I had been locked away from others by my terror of being known
and annihilated, I now plunged into communication with others, friends and strangers
alike, with reckless, uncalled-for intensity, convinced that there could be nothing more
important than that we should know each other without reservation while so briefly and
miraculously alive. I sought intimacy swiftly and unselfconsciously, entirely unperturbed
when this led to embarrassing or absurd consequences. On one occasion, in London, a
friend took me back to the house he shared with others. We entered the living room
together: my friend's fellow lodgers, all complete strangers to me, were watching
television. I strode across the room and, without a moment's thought, turned the
television off, quite sure that meeting each other was of infinitely greater significance
than watching flickering images on a screen in silence.
Up till now I had instinctively presumed, without quite realizing it, that that which is of
supreme value in existence must be something hidden and remote, buried deep in the
structure of the cosmos, or in the intricacies of the human psyche. Now I experienced
supreme value as something brazenly apparent in my immediate surroundings, as
something I could see, touch, and become a part of. What hitherto I had only had a
glimpse of in isolated, battering moments of ecstasy and terror, I now endured as a day by
day reality, it being the new world in which I found myself. It was as if I had had my
familiar self and world dissolved away by some psychoactive drug, and I now
experienced reality naked and raw – except that there were no hallucinations, and the
whole experience lasted, not for a few hours, but for six weeks.
One point still worried me: the megalomania of philosophy, in which I seemed to be
caught. Scientific impulses to know and understand, and artistic impulses to create,
might contain within them secret, unacknowledged desires to acquire God-like status: but
in the case of philosophy, the desire to become God seemed blatant, horrifying and
grotesque. The great philosophers were, I felt, little better than would-be great dictators,
who tried by intellectual means to establish absolute power over humanity for ever. Each
philosopher dreamed up his own personal vision of how he desired the universe, life and
society to be, and then sought to foist this personal vision onto the rest of us by arguing
that reason alone proved the vision to be true, the one and only absolute, objective reality.
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The philosophical picture of reality is not put forward honestly as a personal wish or
dream, as a suggestion or proposal, a possibility open for the rest of us to consider, to
accept, reject or modify as we please. It is put forward as final Truth established and
authenticated by mighty Reason for ever – Truth that we are all obliged to accept and
adopt. By means of this trick of dressing up what he desires as the commands of Reason
alone, the great philosopher seeks to hypnotize humanity intellectually, so that the rest of
us come to believe, value and do what he desires and dictates. Under the impression that
we are observing the edicts of reason, we quietly become the great philosopher's slaves.
Plato – generally acknowledged to be one of the very greatest of philosophers – seems
an especially blatant case in point. In The Republic, Socrates argues on behalf of Plato
that society must be organized in the way the philosopher deems to be right, for he alone
– via his intellectual perception of the entities of mathematics – has perceived the Form
of the Good and thus is able to know what constitutes the good society. In brief, he,
Plato, needs to be given absolute power for he, alone, knows what is good for the rest of
us.14
Plato is perhaps an extreme case. I felt however that the Platonic lust for power, the
Platonic urge to become God, concealed beneath a smokescreen of professed wisdom,
was inherent in the very enterprise of philosophy itself, as traditionally conceived. For
not only Plato, but other philosophers too, traditionally try to show that a personal vision
of how things are and ought to be is the unique and absolute Truth, decreed by Reason,
which ought to be accepted as such by humanity for ever. What is this but the attempt to
become the dictator of humanity by intellectual means?
All this might horrify me: but was not I also guilty of just such a dictatorial project?
After my (admittedly highly anti-Platonic) mystical experience of reality, did not I now
desire to tell humanity of my great discovery? For had not I discovered the solution to
the great riddle of existence?
Recoiling in horror from this realization, I decided that in future we cannot possibly
put our trust in the rare great philosopher or prophet: we must all become prophets. We
must all make up our cosmos, our life, our world of value, for ourselves and each other.
We are all philosophers, even as children. A vital part of the intellectual deception of the
great philosophers – the would-be great dictators – is to fool us into thinking that
philosophy is a highly abstruse field, much too difficult for most of us, our confidence in
our capacity to think for ourselves thus being undermined. This is a crucial step in Plato's
argument. Much subsequent education, right down to the present, conspires to make
most of us lose rather than gain confidence in our capacity to think responsibly and
seriously about fundamental issues for ourselves. And experts of all kinds – scientific,
medical, technological, religious, academic, even political – seek to cloak their expertise
in jargon so that it is incomprehensible to the layman, thus further undermining our
confidence in our ability to judge and know for ourselves. This vast, elaborate conspiracy
to deprive us of our wits, our capacity to know and understand our world, must be
resisted. What we urgently need is a democracy of prophets.
But was not I still a kind of would-be intellectual dictator, in preaching this great
message that we must all be prophets, and make up our world as we live? For here was I,
a kind of privileged meta-prophet, dictating to humanity the great Truth that we are all
prophets.
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It seemed to me that the only way this final dreadful charge of intellectual
dictatorialism could be avoided was to abolish absolute Truth itself. There are stories,
myths. The great mistake is to take any one story to be the story, the absolute Truth,
Reality itself. It is the everlasting temptation to do this which creates the impossible
problem of how to reconcile the physical universe with our human world as we
experience it. We suppose that the scientific myth is the Truth, Reality itself: and then
we are confronted with the impossible problem of accommodating all that science leaves
out: sensory qualities of things, thoughts and feelings, meaning, freedom and value. The
solution is to reject the initial premise. Science does not provide us with a privileged
access to Truth and Reality: the scientific conception of the world is one myth amongst
others, in some respects better than others, in other respects worse. Scientific entities like
electrons and protons are fictional objects like gods: useful for certain purposes, but not
to be taken too seriously.
I thus lapsed into a kind of relativism. Nevertheless, convinced that I had made
discoveries of momentous importance – above all, that the riddle of existence is the
riddle of our desires, philosophy being about the vital problem of what we should do
with our lives – I was eager to return to Manchester to astound my philosophy
mentors with the intellectual riches I had stumbled across. Academic philosophy was
not the tedious discipline I had so far encountered, concerned only with sterile
problems of dead knowledge: it was vital and alive, charged with personal
experience, ready to grapple with urgent and basic problems of life.
Back at Manchester, I found I could not open my mouth. The dramatic and vital
enterprise that philosophy had now become for me seemed to have no connection
whatsoever with philosophy as conducted in the Department at Manchester University.
The idea that philosophy might have something to do with life, with the great mysteries
of existence, with problems of living in the real world, seemed to be grotesquely out of
context in the Philosophy Departmental Seminar at Manchester. Merely to take
philosophy seriously seemed laughable. The rich and extraordinary world that I had
discovered that Summer began to fade away. My mouth was full of concrete, and I could
not speak. I began to despair.
In the third year, things became really grim. The course became devoted to Oxford
philosophy, which struck me as the absolute nadir of what philosophy might be. The
proper task of philosophy is to articulate our most urgent, general and fundamental
problems – problems of thought and life – and propose and critically assess possible
solutions, or at least help keep alive this vital activity. Oxford philosophy, and much
analytic philosophy which stems from it, quietly denies, by implication, that any such
activity is possible for philosophy at all. For it is implicitly – and idiotically – taken for
granted that philosophy cannot be about problems that concern the real world, because
philosophy is not empirically based. Hence, philosophy can do no more than analyze
concepts. Not only does this deny to philosophy the very possibility of its proper task. It
condemns philosophy to intellectual dishonesty. For the results of conceptual analysis
are presented as being no more than conceptual clarification. But inherent in the meaning
of words there lurk factual, metaphysical, value and even political assumptions. Such
assumptions must be implicit in the supposed “conceptual clarifications” of analytic
philosophy – even though this will, of course, be denied. Thus Gilbert Ryle, in his The
Concept of Mind, claims merely to analyze mental concepts. Actually, the book
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insinuates the doctrine of behaviourism, but this is done in a covert and dishonest fashion,
and is explicitly disavowed.15 The absolute pits of Oxford philosophy, for me, was J.L.
Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia, so smugly and idiotically reducing the problem of the
nature of reality to the meaning of the word “real”.16
I was so appalled by Oxford philosophy, and so frightened of becoming indoctrinated
by such rubbish, that I stopped attending lectures entirely, but nevertheless managed to
pass the final exam, and obtain my degree.
MA Thesis, Karl Popper, and J. J. C. Smart
I decided to spend two years attempting to capture in an MA thesis what I had
discovered in the Summer of 1961, and then somehow mislaid in my despair at not being
able to open my mouth about it. I still had this sense I had discovered something of
profound significance, even though I now felt I no longer knew quite what it was. My
thesis, I decided, should tackle the problem of how to reconcile the two worlds of my
megalomaniacal youth: the universe of physics on the one hand, and the human world of
common sense, of experience, consciousness, meaning and value on the other. My initial
idea was that these should be treated as two myths, two stories, neither to be taken too
seriously as the one and only truth.
But then I discovered work by Karl Popper, and in particular his argument that we
cannot verify scientific theories, we can only refute them. I was impressed. This was
close to my own view of the matter, but also subtly different. Popper was a firm believer
in truth, even though he also thought it was very difficult to get hold of. Physics, for
Popper, very definitely, was not one story amongst others, no more or no less valid than
others. As a result of reading Popper, my whole view of the task of philosophy was
transformed.
Up till then my approach to philosophy was to take a problem – “Do we see stars?”, “Is
the mind the brain?” – and write a kind of mini drama, invisible protagonists deploying
arguments for and against. In this way, I thought, one could acquire philosophical
insight. For Popper, this was clearly no good at all. One should begin with a serious,
open, difficult problem (excellent!) and one should try to solve it. One should try to get
at the truth of the matter, even though this might be very difficult, and even though, even
if one did solve the problem, one could have no assurance that one had definitively
solved it. All our knowledge, all our attempted solutions, can only be, for ever, guesses,
conjectures. And one should find out about the history of attempts to solve the problem,
assess critically past attempted solutions, and then attempt, if possible, to do better.
Above all, one should write in as simple and clear a way as possible, avoiding all jargon
and technicalities, unless they proved absolutely necessary.
This passage of Popper’s in particular made a big impact:
The belief of a liberal – the belief in the possibility of a rule of law, of equal
justice, of fundamental rights, and a free society – can easily survive the
recognition that judges are not omniscient and may make mistakes about facts
and that, in practice, absolute justice is hardly ever realized in any particular
case. But this belief in the possibility of a rule of law, of justice, and of
freedom, can hardly survive the acceptance of an epistemology which teaches
that there are no objective facts; not merely in this particular case, but in any
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other case: and that the judge cannot have made a factual mistake because he
can no more be wrong about the facts than he can be right.17
I found this argument utterly convincing. It was actually profoundly immoral not to
believe in objective factual truth, the world of objective fact, existing independently of us,
whether we were aware of it or not. It was just this, I realized, ashamed of myself, that I
had abandoned with my view that there are just stories, no one story having the right to
claim to be the story, the one true story. The world exists, whatever stories we may make
up about it. Many are false. Some parts of some are, no doubt, true, in that what they say
to be the case, really is the case. Far from stories swallowing up the world, stories are just
a tiny bit of the vast universe which exists entirely independently of what we think about
it, apart from the tiny bit of the universe that happens to be ourselves.
I would have to revise entirely my hopelessly inadequate attempted solution to my
problem. I decided that the worlds of (1) physics, and (2) the experiential, are not
different stories, neither having the right to claim to be true. Rather, they are concerned
with different aspects of all that there is. The problem now became to pin down exactly
what aspect each is concerned with, and what, exactly, prohibits physics from saying
anything about the experiential aspect.
I became an occasional student at the LSE, and attended Popper’s lectures and
seminars. I was immensely impressed with the originality and clarity of what he had to
say. His incidental remarks seemed to me to demolish casually whole swathes of received
views, public opinion and prejudice. He spoke against the idea that the future will decide
about the merit of works of art. He characterized a great deal of contemporary philosophy
as amounting to no more than a “word salad”: words are tossed about, but nothing
substantial is achieved. He stressed, again and again, the importance of beginning with a
statement of one’s problem. He pointed out that critical rationalism is relevant even in the
arts. An artist tries things out, criticizes what he has done, tries again, and so on until
what has been done is deemed sufficiently good to survive.
I read Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, and quite literally wept with relief
and joy. At last I had found a work of philosophy that had profound things to say about a
profound problem: the severe difficulties that face the open, liberal society, even some of
the most revered thinkers, above all Plato and Marx, being enemies of it. I was especially
impressed with the way Popper was able to show that the rational society is the open
society (highly relevant to ideas I was subsequently to develop). Given pre-Popperian
conceptions of reason, one might suppose that the rational society would be a grim
dictatorship of reason, rigidly controlled by rules of reason. Once one accepts Popper’s
critical rationalist conception of reason, however, it becomes clear that the rational society
is a society in which criticism flourishes, which in turn requires toleration of diversity of
views and values, which is the liberal, open society. There could not be a greater contrast
with the spurious trivialities of Oxford philosophy. I remember thinking in one of his
lectures: ‘This man is a great philosopher, an historical figure, standing in line with David
Hume, Immanuel Kant, John Locke and Rene Descartes’.
Later, I came rather to pity Popper. He had had this profoundly important idea.
Theories cannot be verified in science, they can only be falsified: nevertheless, it is this
that makes scientific progress possible, and so incredibly successful. This process of
subjecting theories to ferocious attempted falsification can be generalized so that,
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whatever we are doing, we can hope to make progress if we subject ideas – attempted
solutions to problems – to ferocious criticism. I had no doubt about the importance of the
idea – its widespread implications. And yet it seemed to be extraordinarily difficult to get
the significance of the idea widely appreciated, not because the idea is esoteric and
difficult to understand, but the exact reverse, because it is so simple. In those days,
around 1964, few philosophers thought much of Popper. One or two famous scientists
admired his work: Peter Medawar, Hermann Bondi, John Eccles. The public had never
heard of him. I saw Popper condemned endlessly to repeat himself, endlessly and
hopelessly condemned to trying to tell the world of the fundamental importance, for all
that we do, of subjecting our imaginative ideas to severe critical scrutiny. Never, never, I
vowed, must I allow myself to suffer a similar fate.
And at the time I did not think it was remotely likely that I would, because I had
become convinced that Popper had essentially sorted out the fundamental problems of
philosophy – the fundamental problems with which I had been so agonizingly obsessed. I
heaved an immense sigh of relief. I no longer had the sense that I had discovered and lost
something of profound significance for humanity which I must try to recover, articulate
and put into the public arena. Popper had done it – or would soon have done it, I
reckoned, when people woke up to the significance of his work. I could relax. There
were, it is true, a few questions Popper had not discussed, in particular my problem
concerning physics and common sense, the experiential world. There was still something
for me to do. But this was little more than pottering about on the sidelines. It did not
concern the epoch-making matter of the future of humanity.
Back in Manchester, I discovered another excellent book: J.J.C. Smart’s Philosophy
and Scientific Realism. This defended physicalism – the doctrine that the universe and
everything in it is made up exclusively of the fundamental entities of physics: electrons,
protons, neutrons and photons, or whatever these entities might be. The experiential
world, thoughts and mental processes, aesthetic and moral qualities: all these are nothing
but physical processes that are, ultimately, interactions between the basic entities of
physics. Nothing but physics exists.
Not for one moment did I believe this. But I found Smart’s book admirable, because of
its clarity, its lucid exposition and defence of an important thesis, and its refusal to have
anything to do with the sophisticated absurdities and dishonesty of Oxford analytic
philosophy. In one bound, Smart had broken the idiotic convention that philosophy has
nothing to do with the real world. He defended brilliantly a sweeping doctrine about the
real world.
His book provided me with just the framework, the background, I needed for my thesis.
I could devote much of my book to demonstrating what was wrong, or inadequate, in
Smart’s physicalist doctrine, and what one needed to put in its place. Physicalism, in my
view, was absolutely correct as long as one did not claim, as Smart did, that everything
comes within the scope of physicalism. It provides us with a picture of an aspect of what
there is, but does not tell us about all that there is.
My task, as I have said, was to pin down exactly what aspect the physical, and the
experiential, are concerned with, and what, exactly, prohibits physics from saying
anything about the experiential aspect.
Physics, it occurred to me, seeks to predict. It is concerned only with that aspect of
things which determines the way events, or isolated systems, evolve in time and space.
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As I wrote, something entirely unexpected and rather extraordinary occurred. Out of the
tip of my biro, as I scribbled, had come, entirely unforeseen, a decisive refutation of one
the pillars of modern philosophy, one of its strongest, best established doctrines. I refer
to Hume’s account of causation. Hume had argued that there could not be any kind of
necessary connection between cause and effect. Nothing in one event, at one moment,
could possibly determine, with necessity, what occurred at the next instant. I discovered
that we must be even more epistemologically modest than Hume. For all we can know,
necessary connections between successive states of affairs may well exist. Indeed, it is
precisely the task of physics to try to discover what such a necessary connection may be.
Theoretical physics seeks to discover necessitating properties of fundamental physical
entities. If an electron is electrically charged then, of necessity, it will accelerate in a
prescribed way when placed in an electric field. Indeed, all ordinary physical properties
– solidity, rigidity, opacity, and so on – carry implications about how the object that
possesses the property will, of necessity, change, or resist change, in certain
circumstances.
Physics, then, is exclusively about what may be called the causally efficacious aspect
of things, that aspect which everything has in common with everything else, and which
determines necessarily (but perhaps probabilisitically) how events unfold. Everything
not required in order to predict how events unfold - the experiential aspect of things –
will be ignored by physics Given any isolated system – any physical system isolated
from all influences from outside – physics seeks (in principle) to be able to predict how
that system evolves, given a specification of its state at some instant. But physics is only
interested in predicting specifications of the state of the system when described in the
same terms, in order to predict further states of the system. Physics is thus not interested
in predicting everything about the system. If it contains a conscious person who sees a
yellow daffodil, has the visual experience of seeing the yellow daffodil, thinks ‘that’s a
daffodil’ and then says “that’s a daffodil”, then physics will (in principle) describe the
physics of all this: the molecular structure of the daffodil, the light reflected from the
daffodil, the nerve impulses that travel up the optic nerve and around the brain of the
person, the contraction of muscles, the sound waves emitted from the vocal chords and
the mouth. But what the daffodil looks like, what it is to experience seeing the yellow
daffodil, what it is to think ‘this is a daffodil, and what “this is a daffodil” means, all this
is ignored by physics because ignoring it does not in any way undermine its predictive
task.
But it went further. It was not just that physics did not need to specify experiential
qualities to achieve its predictive task successfully. I discovered an argument which
showed conclusively that physics could not predict the experiential features of things,
even if it wanted to (as it were). All physical statements – all physical concepts – are
such that you do not need to have had any special kind of experience in order to
understand them. Being blind from birth does not debar you from understanding the
whole of optics, or the wave theory of light, just as well as any sighted person. But when
it comes to experiential features, all this is dramatically different. If you are to know
what “yellow” means, or what it is to assert “that daffodil is yellow”, then you do, at
some time in your life, need to have experienced the visual sensation of yellowness. A
person blind from birth is not thereby debarred from understanding any part of physics,
but he is debarred from knowing what it is that “This daffodil is yellow” asserts. This
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means that no conglomeration of statements of physics can ever imply a statement such
as “This daffodil is yellow” where “yellow” is understood to refer to the perceptual or
experiential quality, what we normally sighted people see when we see daffodils.
The silence of physics about colours, sounds, smells, tactile qualities as we experience
them does not mean that these experiential qualities do not really exist out there in the
world around us. All it means is that these qualities are just the sort of properties that
physics does not need to specify, predict or describe in order to fulfil its predictive,
explanatory task. And furthermore, even if physics wished to predict these experiential
qualities, it could not, because physics is such that no special kind of experience is
required to understand it, but experiential qualities are such that special kinds of
experiences are required to understand them, know what they are.
And precisely the same considerations arise in connection with our inner experiences.
The silence of physics about our inner experiences, our thoughts and feelings, does not
mean that these mental features do not really exist. All it means is that these mental
features of brain processes are just the sort of features that physics does not need to
specify, predict or describe in order to fulfil its predictive, explanatory task. And
furthermore, even if physics wished to predict these mental features of our brain
processes, it could not, because physics can be understood without one having to have
any special kind of experience, whereas the mental feature of brain processes are such
that you do have to have, in your own brain, just those brain processes in order to know
what the mental features of those brain processes are.
I had solved my problem of specifying precisely what aspect of things physics is
concerned with, and what aspect of things common sense, or the human world view, is
concerned with. I had solved the problem of understanding how our human world, full of
experiential qualities, could exist embedded in the physical universe.
And I had done more. Not only had I refuted Hume on causation. I had solved the
philosophical part of the mind/brain problem. I had demonstrated, indeed, that the
mind/brain problem is, in important respects, similar to the “yellow daffodil/daffodil as
physical object” problem.18 (Few philosophers today appreciate that the so-called hard
problem of consciousness was solved long ago in 1965, the year I finished my MA
thesis.)
All this gave precision to the explosive discovery I had made in the Summer of 1961
that Cartesian dualism is wrong, mental or experiential features exist in the world
external to us as well as within us, that we are, in a sense, as much a part of the world
external to us as within us, and our inner world is as mysterious to us as the world
external to us.
Some years later, I argued that, not only experiential features, but value features too
exist in the world around us, the latter perceived (fallibly) by our emotional responses to
things.19
I wrote up my thesis, obtained my MA, and published three papers, in 1966 and 1968,
which spelled out what I had discovered.20 I assumed that these papers would have an
explosive impact on philosophy. Not at all. There was absolute silence.
However, eight years later Thomas Nagel published ‘What is it Like to Be a Bat?’, and
twenty years later Frank Jackson published ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’.21 These papers
did no more than express, perhaps in a somewhat more vivid way, a fragment of what I
had argued for in 1966 and 1968.22 Unlike my papers, however, they had an immense
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impact, not only on philosophy, but on psychology, cognitive science, artificial
intelligence and neuroscience as well. Decades later, in 1999, I wrote to Nagel and
Jackson to ask them if they had come across my papers – and I sent copies. Nagel replied
with great generosity “There is no justice. No, I was unaware of your papers, which made
the central point before anyone else.” Jackson admitted he had read my “Understanding
Sensations”. In his case, something close to plagiarism (of idea, not words) is involved.
Some time later I met Jackson, and raised the matter with him. He said he had now
abandoned what tends to be called “the knowledge argument”. So, having taken credit
for my work, he had now repudiated it!
As for my Hume paper, some years later Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley and David
Armstrong23 published work along somewhat similar lines, again without any reference
to, or apparent awareness of, my much earlier paper.
Does any of this matter, apart from my personal pique at not getting recognition for my
work? At the time, I was unconcerned but now, in retrospect, I am not so sure. In both
cases, only a bit of what I had argued for came to the attention of philosophers. Most of
what I argued for is still ignored by, and unknown to, most philosophers. What I have
done since in developing these ideas has been ignored as well.24 As for my Hume paper,
subsequent work by others suffers from failing to reproduce key points of my argument.
In 1989, Bas van Fraassen criticized anti-Humean accounts of physics on the grounds that
if physical laws are necessary, they cannot be empirical, if empirical they cannot be
necessary.25 This criticism is lethal against the views of Dretske, Tooley and Armstrong,
but does not apply to my 1968 paper, which van Fraassen does not mention. In my paper,
I stressed that physical theories need to be interpreted so that physical laws are analytic,
and so necessary, all the factual content of the theory being concentrated in the assertion:
such and such entities exist with such and such necessitating properties.
From my own personal standpoint, by far the worst consequence of the neglect of my
first three publications was that when, a few years later, I really did have something
important to communicate, concerning the future welfare of humanity, I failed. If my
early work had received the recognition that was its due, later far more important work
would undoubtedly have won far greater attention. I would not have had to struggle for
decades to get it noticed, and still fail, even today.
London and the Comprehensibility of the Universe
After obtaining my MA, I taught philosophy of science in the Philosophy Department
at Manchester for a year. Then, in 1966, I got a job teaching philosophy of science in the
Department of History and Philosophy of Science at University College London, where I
remained until my early retirement in 1994.
In London, I took up three projects: (1) to write a book expounding my solution to the
human world/physical universe problem (encapsulated in my MA thesis and first three
papers) ; (2) to develop a fully micro-realistic, fundamentally probabilistic version of
quantum theory; and (3) to assess the validity of criticisms then being made of Popper’s
views about science. The first project fell by the wayside.26 The second led to a long
sequence of papers which did result, finally, in a micro-realistic, probabilistic version of
quantum theory free of the defects of the orthodox version, able to solve the quantum
wave/particle problem, and empirically distinct from the orthodox version (although not
yet, as far as I know, put to the test of experiment).27 The third project led to my
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profound discovery – or what I cannot help but see as a “profound discovery”: the urgent
need to transform academia so that it gives intellectual priority to our problems of living,
and devotes reason to the task of helping humanity make progress towards as good a
world as possible.
Aware of the criticisms swirling around Popper’s work, in part because of a review I
wrote for Nature of a book comparing and contrasting Kuhn and Popper,28 I decided to
write a paper in which I would work out, for myself, whether any of these criticisms
really struck home.
According to Popper, as everyone knows, science cannot verify theories, but can only
refute them. This sounds very negative, but actually it is not, for science succeeds in
making such astonishing progress by subjecting its theories to sustained, ferocious
attempted falsification. Every time a scientific theory is refuted by experiment or
observation, scientists are forced to try to think up something better, and it is this,
according to Popper, which drives science forward. Thus, in order to maximize the
chances of progress, scientists should put forward theories that have as much empirical
content as possible, and are thus as vulnerable to empirical falsification as possible –
these theories then being subjected to severe attempted empirical falsification. The best
that we can hope for from science is theories that have survived such a ferocious
empirical onslaught.
I entirely endorsed Popper’s point that we cannot verify scientific theories; we can only
falsify them. I had grasped this point, in essence, as a child when I first learnt of Hume’s
arguments concerning induction and causation. Criticisms of Popper made by Kuhn,
Feyerabend, Lakatos and others did not seem to me to be too serious.29 What did seem to
me to be serious, however, was Popper’s failure to do justice to the fact that science only
ever accepts theories that are unified,30 or explanatory. As I have indicated, Popper holds
that that theory should be accepted which has the highest empirical content and has
survived the severest onslaught of attempted refutation, thus being best corroborated.
Given an accepted unified theory, T, we can always formulate a rival, T*, which has
higher empirical content, and is better corroborated, by adding onto T independently
testable, tested and corroborated conjectures.31 In general, however, T* would be
horribly disunified and, quite properly, would not be considered in scientific practice for
just that reason. Popper’s methodology thus persistently recommends acceptance of
theories that would never be considered in scientific practice for a moment. His
methodology is refuted.
Popper tried to overcome this difficulty by arguing that a high degree of simplicity (or
unity) is the same as high empirical content. But what the above indicates is that this is
not the case. We can increase empirical content and at the same time drastically decrease
simplicity, or unity.
Subsequently, Popper proposed that an acceptable theory "should proceed from some
simple, new, and powerful, unifying idea”.32 This does much better justice to scientific
practice. But this “requirement of simplicity”, as Popper calls it, contradicts the rest of
his methodology. It contradicts the requirement that we should accept that theory which
has the greatest empirical content and is best corroborated – which, as the above
argument shows, can invariably be concocted to be a T*-type theory, horribly complex
and disunified.
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Quite properly, then, scientists only accept unified, explanatory theories even though
better corroborated disunified, non-explanatory rivals can always be formulated. But
Popper cannot provide a rationale for this procedure. He cannot explain why this
procedure gives us the best hope of achieving scientific progress. Such a procedure is
only a sensible one to adopt, so it would seem, if we have good reasons to accept the
metaphysical thesis that the universe is such that a unified pattern of law governs
phenomena. If the universe is not like that, and basic laws are disunified, then adopting
the procedure will block progress. Popper, however, cannot appeal to such a
metaphysical thesis. He excludes metaphysics from science.
Then it dawned on me – and it was a definite moment when I had this revolutionary
idea: the only way to make sense of science is to see the whole enterprise as accepting, as
a basic item of (conjectural) scientific knowledge, that the universe is such that there is
some kind of unified pattern of physical law running through all phenomena, the universe
being, in this sense, physically comprehensible.
In one respect, Popper’s conception of science is highly unorthodox: all scientific
knowledge is conjectural; theories are falsified but cannot be verified. But in other
respects, Popper’s conception of science is highly orthodox. For Popper, as for most
scientists and philosophers, the basic aim of science is knowledge of truth, the basic
method being to assess theories with respect to evidence, nothing being accepted as a
part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. This orthodox view – referred to
above as standard empiricism – is, I realized, false. The fact that physicists only ever
accept unified theories even though endlessly many empirically more successful
disunified rivals can always be concocted, means that science makes a big, permanent,
and highly problematic assumption about the nature of the universe independently of
empirical considerations and even, in a sense, in violation of empirical considerations –
namely, at the very least, that the universe is such that all grossly disunified theories are
false. Without some such presupposition as this, the whole empirical method of science
breaks down.
Suppose physicists only ever accepted theories that postulate atoms, even though many
empirically better corroborated theories are available which postulate other entities, such
as fields. It would be clear that physicists thereby make the assumption that the universe
is made up of atoms, whether this is acknowledged or not. Just the same holds in
connection with physicists’ persistent acceptance of unified theories, even though
empirically better corroborated disunified rivals are available. Physicists thereby make
the assumption that there is some kind of underlying unity in nature, whether they
acknowledge this or not.
Popper, along with most scientists and philosophers, had misidentified the basic aim of
science. This is not truth per se. It is rather truth presupposed to be unified, presupposed
to be explanatory or comprehensible (unified theories being explanatory). Inherent in the
aim of science there is the metaphysical – that is, untestable – assumption that there is
some kind of underlying unity in nature. The universe is, in some way, physically
comprehensible.
But this assumption is profoundly problematic. We do not know that the universe is
comprehensible. This is highly conjectural scientific knowledge. Even if it is
comprehensible, almost certainly it is not comprehensible in the way science presupposes
it is today. For good Popperian reasons, this metaphysical assumption must be made
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explicit within science and subjected to sustained criticism, as an integral part of science,
in an attempt to improve it.
The outcome is the aim-oriented empiricist conception of science I have indicated
above.33 This facilitates progressive improvement of problematic assumptions inherent
in aims by representing aims, and associated methods, in the form of a hierarchy, it
becoming possible to improve the most problematic aims low down in the hierarchy in
the light of improving knowledge, and less problematic aims high up in the hierarchy.34
At first I thought that this aim-oriented empiricist view is in such flagrant contradiction
with orthodoxy that no scientist would have upheld it. But then it occurred to me that
Einstein in his later years had held a similar view. More important, I discovered that, in
creating special and general relativity, he had successfully put into practice the
methodology of discovery that becomes available once aim-oriented empiricism is
adopted.35 Science implements aim-oriented empiricism in practice, but this is obscured
and obstructed by widespread acceptance of standard empiricism.
It then dawned on me that the aim of seeking explanatory truth is a special case of the
more general aim of seeking valuable truth – of value for its own sake, or for practical
ends. And this is sought in order that it be used by people to enrich their lives. In other
words, in addition to metaphysical assumptions inherent in the aims of science there are
value assumptions, and political assumptions, assumptions about how science should be
used in life. These are, if anything, even more problematic than metaphysical
assumptions. Here, too, assumptions need to be made explicit and critically assessed, as
an integral part of science, by scientists and non-scientists alike, in an attempt to improve
them.
Released from the crippling constraints of standard empiricism, science would, I felt,
burst out into a wonderful new life, realizing its full potential, responding fully both to
our sense of wonder and to human suffering, becoming both more rigorous and of greater
human value (intellectually and practically).
My Apparent Great Discovery
Then one day, walking back home from work, I stumbled across my (apparent) great
discovery.
I had been immensely impressed by the way Popper had generalized his falsificationist
conception of scientific method to form a notion of rationality, critical rationalism,
applicable to all aspects of human life. Falsification becomes the more general idea of
criticism. Just as scientists make progress by subjecting their theories to sustained
attempted empirical falsification, so too all of us, whatever we may be doing, can best
hope to achieve progress by subjecting relevant ideas to sustained, severe criticism. By
subjecting our attempts at solving our problems to criticism, we give ourselves the best
hope of discovering (when relevant) that our attempted solutions are inadequate or fail,
and we are thus compelled to try to think up something better. By means of judicious use
of criticism, in personal, social and political life, we may be able to achieve, in life,
progressive success somewhat like the progressive success achieved by science. We can,
in this way, in short, learn from scientific progress how to make personal and social
progress in life. This, for me, in a nutshell, was Popper’s great achievement: to have
come up with a revolutionary conception of the progress-achieving methods of science
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which he then went on to show had, when generalized, profoundly fruitful implications
for a wide range of human endeavours.36
It suddenly occurred to me: I could pursue a path parallel to Popper’s. Just as Popper
had generalized falsificationism to form critical rationalism, so I could generalize my
aim-oriented empiricist conception of scientific method to form an aim-oriented
conception of rationality, potentially fruitfully applicable to all that we do, to all spheres
of human life. But the great difference would be this. I would be starting out from a
conception of science – of scientific method – that enormously improves on Popper’s
notion. In generalizing this, to form a general idea of progress-achieving rationality, I
would be creating an idea of immense power and fruitfulness.
I knew already that the line of argument developed by Popper, from falsificationism to
critical rationalism, was of profound importance for our whole culture and social order,
and had far-reaching implications and application for science, art and art criticism,
literature, music, academic inquiry quite generally, politics, law, morality, economics,
psychoanalytic theory, evolution, education, history – for almost all aspects of human life
and culture.37 The analogous line of argument I was developing, from aim-oriented
empiricism to aim-oriented rationalism, would have even more fruitful implications and
applications for all these fields, starting as it did from a much improved initial conception
of the progress-achieving methods of science.
The key point is extremely simple – as I have already indicated. It is not just in science
that aims are profoundly problematic. This is true in life as well. We all die. This in
itself makes our life aims problematic. Government, industry, agriculture, medicine, the
military, diplomacy, business, education, the law: all have problematic aims. Above all,
the aim of creating a good world is inherently problematic, for all sorts of more or less
obvious reasons. Furthermore, it is not just in science that problematic aims are
misconstrued or “repressed”; this happens all too often in life too, both at the level of
individuals, and at the institutional or social level as well. There is an urgent need – I
began to realize – for science to acknowledge, openly and honestly, its real and highly
problematic aims so that it could begin to put aim-oriented empiricism explicitly into
practice, and thus explicitly improve its aims and methods as it proceeds. Science needs
to do this, thus making explicit and apparent its at present implicit and covert exploitation
of aim-oriented empiricism, so that we can all see clearly what this aim-improving meta-
methodology is, and just how extraordinarily successful it is, as far as science itself is
concerned. Science thus becomes a methodological paradigm, a methodological
resource, for the rest of life. The task then becomes to feed aim-oriented rationalism,
generalized from the methods of science, into personal, institutional and social life, so
that we may improve our aims and methods as we live – so essential if we are to realize
what is genuinely of value to us in life.
But this task struck me as profoundly difficult to perform. Despite its immense
desirability, its fundamental importance for the future of humanity, it would meet fierce
resistance at all levels, personal, institutional, social, global. It occurred to me that the
social sciences and humanities would need to take up, as a long-term project, to work out
how we might feed aim-oriented rationality into personal, institutional and social life.
This would require the social sciences to be pursued as social methodology, or social
philosophy, fundamentally concerned to help us improve aims and methods in life rather
than acquire knowledge about social phenomena. I discovered that Popper, in arguing
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from scientific method to rationality and the open society, had been anticipated by the
philosophes of the French Enlightenment, and I read Peter Gay’s great book The
Enlightenment: An Interpretation, enthralled. But even though the philosophes had had
their hearts in the right place, they had blundered, I realized, in thinking the task was to
develop social science alongside natural science. If the basic Enlightenment idea is to
learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened
world, and the task of social inquiry is to work out how to do this, then social inquiry
needs to be developed as social methodology, helping us to get into social life progress
achieving methods generalized from those that have been exploited with such success in
science.
It began to dawn on me that academia as a whole, in thrall to the idea that first,
knowledge must be acquired so that, then, subsequently, it can be applied to help solve
social problems, is irrational in a far more elementary, wholesale and damaging way than
I had realized. Inspired again by Popper, it seemed to me obvious that absolutely
elementary rules of rational problem solving are that one (1) articulates, and seeks to
improve the articulating of, the problem to be solved, and then (2) proposes and critically
assesses possible solutions. If we take seriously the idea that the basic task of academia
is to help us realize what is of value to us in life by educational and intellectual means
then, at the most fundamental level, the task must be (1) to articulate problems of living,
and (2) propose and critically assess possible solutions – possible actions, policies,
political programmes, institutional innovations, philosophies of life. What enables us to
achieve what is of value is what we do, or refrain from doing, not what we know. Even
when new knowledge is required, as it is in medicine or agriculture for example, it is
always what this enables us to do, that enables us to achieve what is of value (except
when knowledge is itself of value).
If it is to devote reason to the best interests of humanity, then academia, I began to
realize, would need to be quite fundamentally reorganized. Social inquiry and the
humanities would need to be at the heart of academia, promoting cooperatively rational
resolving of conflicts and problems of living in the real world (as well as helping us
improve aims and methods in life). This fundamental intellectual activity would
influence aims and priorities of research in the natural and technological sciences, and
would itself, of course, be influenced by the results of such research.38
But what really matters, I realized, is the thinking we engage in as we live, guiding our
actions. A basic task for academia is to help us improve this vital, socially active
thinking.
I was aware that I had rediscovered my great explosive idea of the summer of 1961:
philosophy should be about life; the riddle of the universe is the riddle of our desires. But
my initial idea had been radically transformed. It was no longer just philosophy which
should be concerned with our problems of living, but the whole academic enterprise.
"The riddle of our desires" had become "the profoundly problematic character of our
fundamental aims in life, both personal and institutional, including even the aims of
science". Or it had become, perhaps: the riddle of the desirable – the riddle of what is
ultimately of value in existence. The outcome of generalizing aim-oriented empiricism to
form a general conception of rationality, aim-oriented rationality, and then applying this
to the task of creating a better world, was an entirely new conception, not just of science,
but of academic inquiry, with implications for all of life.
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Every branch and aspect of academic inquiry needs to change, I realized, if it is to be
what it is supposed to be: rationally organized and devoted to helping humanity achieve
what is of value in life.
I was confronted by five revolutions. First, a revolution in the philosophy of science,
from standard to aim-oriented empiricism. Second, a revolution in science itself, so that
it comes to put aim-oriented empiricism explicitly into scientific practice. Third, a
revolution in social inquiry and the humanities, so that they come to give intellectual
priority to problems of living, themselves put aim-oriented rationality into practice and
take, as a basic, long-term task, to help humanity feed aim-oriented rationality into the
social world. Fourth, a revolution in academia as a whole, so that it takes up its proper
task of helping humanity realize what is of value in life. And fifth, and finally, the
revolution that really matters: transforming the human world so that it puts cooperative
problem-solving rationality and aim-oriented rationality into practice in life, so that we
may all realize what is of value as we live in so far as this is possible.
At some point it occurred to me that all this had a devastating implication for my own
personal life: I would have to take up my own portion of personal responsibility for the
state of the planet. For each one of us, it is extraordinarily difficult to feel that the future
of the world has anything to do with what we do personally, in our own life. I am just
one among billions. Anything I do can only have a minuscule impact on the state of the
planet. But this is of course true of all those other billions of people as well. Each one of
us is in the position of being powerless before the juggernaut of history, and yet that
juggernaut is composed of us, of our actions. We are all responsible, and yet,
individually, have only the minutest of impact on the whole. It is only when a majority
of us do begin to take some personal responsibility, in our billions of individual, personal
lives, for our common future, that we human beings can hope to begin to shape our
destiny together, to suit our own best interests, instead of suffering the consequences of
billions of us living without concern for what the net impact of our billions of lives may
be. We all need, it seemed to me, to put something like 5 % of our life effort into a
concern for the state of the planet – the wealthy and powerful, of course, able to do rather
more than the poor and powerless. And all this applied directly to me. I could not
escape. My philosophy was no longer merely an idea and an argument. It is for life. In
particular: my life.
I wrote a book, The Aims of Science, in which I spelled out my discoveries. It was
rejected by publisher after publisher. I became a bit demented, holding forth to friends
and strangers alike on the need to transform our schools and universities. Then a friend
told me of a friend of his prepared to publish a book by me expounding my ideas. I
thought about it, and then wrote my first book, What’s Wrong With Science?, in three
weeks to meet the publisher’s deadline. Most of it takes the form of a fierce debate about
the issues between a scientist and a philosopher. No one convinces anyone of anything
(although I hoped the reader would find the philosopher’s arguments utterly compelling).
I thought this book would release my idea into the world, but the publisher failed to
understand that review copies had to be sent out, the book received only three reviews,
and was in general ignored.
Then Basil Blackwell’s agreed to publish a new book. Slowly and painfully, I
struggled to put clearly into words the new universe of ideas, arguments and values that I
felt I had stumbled across. My argument was that the basic aim of academic inquiry
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should be, not just to acquire knowledge, but rather to enhance our capacity to realize
what is of value in life. But what is this “capacity”? Very much as an afterthought, it
occurred to me that as good a word as any is “wisdom” (even though this had, for me, all
sorts of undesirable connotations). Thus was born the title of my second book: From
Knowledge to Wisdom. This was published in 1984. It received critical reviews from
philosophers, some of whom criticized me for defending doctrines I explicitly rejected in
the book! It received a supportive review from Mary Midgley39 however, and a glowing
review in Nature by Christopher Longuet-Higgins, who wrote:
“Maxwell is advocating nothing less than a revolution (based on reason, not on
religious or Marxist doctrine) in our intellectual goals and methods of inquiry . . .
There are altogether too many symptoms of malaise in our science-based society for
Nicholas Maxwell's diagnosis to be ignored.”40
Unfortunately, my diagnosis has been ignored, and that has something to do with the troubles
we face today. We strive to achieve economic growth, more industry and agriculture,
more wealth, longer lives, more development, housing and roads, more travel, more cars
and aeroplanes, more energy production and use, greater security by means of greater
military might. These things seem inherently desirable and many are, in many ways,
highly desirable. But our successes in achieving these ends also bring about global
warming, war, vast inequalities across the globe, destruction of habitats and rapid
extinction of species, depletion of finite natural resources such as oil, pollution of earth,
sea and air – even the credit crunch of 2008 and global recession. All our current global
problems are the almost inevitable outcome of our long-term failure to put aim-oriented
rationality into practice in life, so that we actively seek to discover problems associated
with long-term aims inherent in our current endeavours, actively explore ways in which
problematic aims can be modified in less problematic directions, and at the same time
develop the social, the political, economic and industrial muscle able to change what we
do, how we live, so that our aims become less problematic, less destructive in both the
short and long term. We have failed even to appreciate the fundamental need to improve
aims and methods as the decades go by. We have failed to see this even in the case of
science. Our very ideals of rationality are such that they fail to help improve aims.
Conventional ideas about rationality are all about means, not about ends, and are not
designed to help us improve our ends as we proceed. Implementing aim-oriented
rationality is essential if we are to survive in the long term, but academia does nothing to
promote this idea, and has failed, so far, even to entertain the idea.
Einstein put his finger on what is wrong when he said "Perfection of means and
confusion of goals seems, to my opinion, to characterize our age."41 This outcome is
inevitable if we restrict rationality to means, and fail to demand that rationality – the
authentic article – must quite essentially include the sustained critical scrutiny of ends.
After the publication of From Knowledge to Wisdom, I turned for a time to grappling with the
problems of quantum theory – partly, perhaps, in order to preserve my sanity. But then, in
1994, after early retirement from University College London (because of horrible things going
on in my Department) I turned again to the first crucial part of my argument concerning
science, and wrote The Comprehensibility of the Universe. In this book I was able to solve a
problem that had haunted me for two decades (a problem that defeated Einstein): What does it
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mean to assert of a theory that it is unified? 42 The book was published by Oxford University
Press in 1998, received excellent reviews, but made no discernible impact on Philosophy of
Science.
Since then, I have continued to develop and expound the “from knowledge to wisdom”
argument in books, papers and lectures. In 2003 I founded Friends of Wisdom, an international
group of academics and educationalists, at the time of writing some 280 members strong,
devoted to promoting wisdom in the university.43 My own university now speaks of “the
wisdom agenda” and “Developing a culture of wisdom at UCL” on its website44 – the
latter the title of a policy document which can be downloaded.45 There are many other
signs that universities have recently begun to put some elements of wisdom-inquiry into
academic practice.46
Our long-term failure to put wisdom-inquiry into practice is, as I see it, a monumental
and very damaging philosophical blunder. For it is a blunder about what ought to be the
aims and methods of inquiry, of learning. For too long we have unthinkingly taken for
granted that inquiry ought to be, in the first instance, devoted to the pursuit of knowledge
whereas, actually, it ought to have been devoted to helping us learn how to realize what is
of value in life. Acquiring knowledge is important, but what humanity primarily needs to
learn is how to live. Academic philosophers ought to be shouting from the rooftops about
this profound philosophical blunder which, as we have seen, now threatens the future of
humanity. At present, they are not. I urge my fellow philosophers to do what philosophy
ought to do: devote reason to the task of helping to create a wiser world.
This, then, is my conclusion. Research in universities has been devoted, primarily, to
acquiring knowledge and technological know-how. But these increase our power to act
which, without wisdom, can lead to as much harm as benefit. Current global crises, and
especially the most serious, global warming, have arisen in this way. We urgently need
to bring about a revolution in our universities so that they come to seek and promote
wisdom – wisdom being understood to be the capacity to realize what is of value in life,
thus including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else
besides. Universities need to take up the task of helping humanity learn how to make
progress towards as good a world as possible. There are signs that this revolution may
already be underway. If so, it is happening with agonizing slowness, in a dreadfully
muddled and piecemeal way. The underlying intellectual reasons for academic change
need to be much more widely appreciated, to help give direction, coherence and a
rationale to this nascent academic revolution, and to help ensure that the intellectual value
and integrity of science, scholarship and education are strengthened and not subverted.
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